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Abstract
We develop a fairly general and tractable model of investment when workers can
invest in multiple skills and di¤erent jobs put di¤erent weights on those skills. In
addition to expected ndings such as that younger workers are more likely than older
workers to respond to a demand shock by investing in skills whose value unexpectedly
increases, we derive some less obvious results. Credit constraints may a¤ect investment
even when they do not bind it equilibrium. If there are mobility costs, rms will
generally have an incentive to invest in some of their workersskills even when there are
a large number of similar competitors, and, in equilibrium, there can be overinvestment
in all skills. Worker skill accumulation resembles learning by doing even in its absence.
We demonstrate how the model can be simulated to show the e¤ect of a shock to the
price of individual skills.
1 Introduction
For roughly ve decades, the Ben-Porath (1967) model has justiably served as the workhorse
model of investment in homogeneous general human capital over the lifetime. But labor
economists increasingly rely on models of multiple skills and tasks to understand earnings
variation across individuals and over the lifetime. The Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)
classication of skills as manual and cognitive and tasks as routine and non-routine plays a
key role in much of the literature on recent changes in the distribution of earnings. Similarly,
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the work of Heckman and coauthors (e.g. Cunha and Heckman 2008) focuses on the dynamics
of investment in cognitive and noncognitive skills, particularly prior to labor market entry.
Urzua and Prada (forthcoming) nd that also accounting for mechanical ability greatly
a¤ects how we should think about investment in education. Bowlus, Mori and Robinson
(forthcoming) explore how skill use evolves over the lifecycle. Altonji (2010), in particular,
emphasizes the need for a research agenda that recognizes that skill is multidimensional and
that jobs di¤er in their requirements.
This paper is intended to contribute to that agenda. It draws heavily on the insights of
Lazear (2009) in viewing jobs as putting linear weights on skills but drops the assumption
that the sum of the weights must be one. We make three main contributions:
1. We develop a relatively tractable model of post-labor market entry job choice and
investment in skills. In its most abstract form, it is very exible; workers may generalize
or specialize over their lifetimes. But we parallel limited general results with an example
that permits stronger conclusions and could be used for calibration.
2. We show that the comparative statics of the model are consistent with what we expect
from such a model. Workers who have relatively more of one skill choose jobs that
put more weight on that skill. Workers with lower discount rates and longer remaining
lifetimes will tend to invest more heavily in skills that unexpectedly become more
valuable.
3. We also provide some results that are, at least to us, to varying degrees surprising:
(a) The process of skill investment and job choice generates persistence even if there
is no learning by doing; workers always continue to invest in any skill they already
have although not necessarily su¢ ciently to o¤set depreciation.
(b) Credit constraints can inuence investment even when in equilibrium they do not
appear to be binding.
(c) Even when all skills are completely general in the sense that there is an arbitrarily
large number of jobs requiring similar skills, in the presence of mobility costs and
rm bargaining power, rms generally have an incentive to invest in some, but
not all, skills used in the job.
(d) In equilibrium, between them, the worker and rm may overinvest in every skill.
This happens quite generally with only two skills and for a class of feasible job
sets regardless of the number of skills.
We begin with a simple two-skill example with two periods. We then generalize the two-
period model and derive a number of analytic results. We conclude by examining continuous
time where we generally rely on a specic functional form and numeric solutions. The
continuous-time example considers the case of individuals who enter the market with equal
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stocks of three skills. Initially it is optimal to invest most heavily in skill 2 and least in
skill 3. Workers are then hit with a shock which would be mildly positive for those workers
if it arrived just when they enter the market but which increases the value of skill 3 and
reduces the value of skill 2. Not surprisingly, older workers continue in jobs that weight skill
two heavily despite the adverse shock. Middle-aged workers partially adjust by gradually
increasing their stock of skill 1 and shift to skill 1-intensive jobs while relatively younger
workers shift to skill 3. Younger workers have a longer lifetime to exploit their skills over,
and so most investment is undertaken when young. Thus, it is (perhaps surprisingly) only
the very youngest workers who benet from the shock.
2 A Simple Example
The worker begins period 0 endowed with skill levels S1  0 and S2  0:We treat premarket
investment as exogenous. We do, however, assume that the worker can arrive in the labor
market with something other than the skills that are optimal for her. This may be due
to uncertainty; the value of skills in the future may be unknown, and the worker or those
investing in her may wish to diversify against this uncertainty. Schooling may be insu¢ ciently
individualized or premarket skill investment may reect goals other than maximizing market
earnings.
A job J is a vector of non-negative weights on the workers skills. At job J , she produces
J1S1 + J2S2. The worker chooses from a set of jobs J given by
(a1J1)
 + (a2J2)
  1 (1)
with a1 > 0; a2 > 0 and  > 1. Optimal choice implies a job on the boundary of J where (1)
holds with equality. Such a job that only uses one skill puts a weight of 1=ai on it. When
 = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1; the boundary is the unit quarter circle in the positive quadrant;
there, a job using both skills equally puts a weight of
p
:5 on each.
As  ! 1; the trade-o¤ between the skills - given by the northeast boundary - tends to a
straight line. The limit is thus the (excluded) case where workers always choose to use only
one skill. As  !1, the job set becomes a square, and it is thus disadvantageous to move
away from using both skills equally; in e¤ect there is only one skill.
2.1 Job Choice
In order for the model to be sensible and helpful, we need to allow for individual heterogeneity.
We would not want the optimal skill vector to be the same for everyone. At the same time, we
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do not wish to make the set of available jobs individual-specic. Consequently, we introduce
a weighting matrix which allows the value of skills within a job to vary both over time and
across individuals. Various basketball skills are less valuable for an unusually short worker
than for one who is unusually tall. Similarly, knowing how to shoe horses is a skill that has
declined in value even though the job persists.
A worker who chooses job J earns 1J1 + 2J2: She therefore maximizes
1J1S1 + 2J2S2    ((a1J1) + (a2J2)   1) : (2)
This problem has the same solution as
A1J1S1 + A2J2S2    (J1 + J2   1) (3)
where Ai = i=ai and has the useful interpretation that Ai is the maximum weight on skill i
in any job. We will show a similar result holds in general and will focus on this formulation
throughout the paper. Changes in A can be thought of capturing changes over time in the
value of a skill or di¤erences in quality of that skill across individuals.
Maximizing gives the rst-order conditions
AiSi = J
 1
i (4)
along with the constraint. Solving the rst-order conditions, we have
Ji =
(AiSi)
1
 1
(A1S1)

 1 + (A2S2)

 1
 1

: (5)
Note that dJi=dSi > 0; the higher a workers skill, the more weight the job she chooses puts
on it.
Finally, using (5), we get the value of the skill endowment
V (S) =

(A1S1)

 1 + (A2S2)

 1
 1

: (6)
Note that this resembles a CES production function except that the exterior exponent is
less than 1 rather than greater than or equal to 1: This is signicant because it means that
the function is convex rather than concave - as a skill increases, production would increase
linearly if the job remained constant; however, the worker re-optimizes and increases the
weight on that skill.
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2.2 Investment
We now extend the example to two periods and allow the worker to invest in skills following
production in period 0, increasing them by I at cost
C(I) = I1 + I

2 : (7)
Note that since skill typically has no natural scale, we can normalize the coe¢ cients on
Ii rather than writing iI

i : Of course, this normalization will a¤ect Si and Ai, but this
simplies the problem. Following the investment choice the worker again chooses a job, so
that the workers lifetime problem is to maximize the Lagrangian
A1J01S1 + A2J02S2 +  (A1J11 (1S1 + I1) + A2J12 (2S2 + I2))
  (I1 + I2 )   (J01 + J02   1)   (J11 + J12   1) (8)
where J0 and J1 are the jobs in periods 0 and 1,  is the discount factor and i is the rate
at which skill i does not depreciate (1 minus the depreciation rate) between periods 0 and 1.
It should be apparent that the problem is separable. First period job choice and investment
do not depend on each other. Separating investment and second-period job choice and using
the formula for V from (6) to simplify it, we get the maximand


(A1 (1S1 + I1))

 1 + (A2 (2S2 + I2))

 1
 1
   (I1 + I2 ) ; (9)
which yields the rst-order conditions for I:

A

 1
i (iSi + Ii)
1
 1
(A1 (1S1 + I1))

 1 + (A2 (2S2 + I2))

 1
 1

  I 1i : = 0 (10)
Claim 1 Investment in skill i is increasing in the quantity of the skill carried forward from
the previous period. That is dIi=d (iSi) > 0:
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem. Since V is convex, its second derivative with
respect to Si is positive while the second derivative of (10) with respect to Ii is negative by
the second-order conditions.
Thus skill builds on itself. A worker who has a high level of skill chooses a job that makes
greater use of that skill. Knowing that she will be in a similar job next period, the worker
chooses to invest more in the type of skill that the worker uses. In a manner somewhat
analogous to Lazear (2009), workers invest in skills that make them particularly good at the
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type of job they currently occupy even though there is no learning by doing.
Claim 1 also implies that workers invest less in skills that depreciate more rapidly. Note
that this occurs even though the investment itself does not depreciate. Instead, because the
skill depreciates, workers know they will choose a job that makes less use of it.
Somewhat informally, we can view workers with higher values of  as being youngerin
the sense that they put more weight on the future. It is evident from (10) that investment
is increasing in .
All of the results in this subsection carry over to the general two-period model.
2.3 Credit Constraints
For the remainder of the example, it is convenient to set i = 1 = ; i.e. there is no
depreciation or discounting.
Heretofore we have assumed that the worker is free to invest as much as she wants. In
contrast, in Ben-Porath workers can only invest up to their current production. Restrictions
on the workers ability to invest can be used to make our model more closely resemble
Ben-Poraths.
More signicantly, in our model, such constraints can have important e¤ects even when
they appear not to bind. Consider the following example. As  ! 1; the worker chooses
a job that specializes in whichever skill she has in greater supply. So she either maximizes
A1 (S1 + I1)   I1 or its equivalent for I2: After maximizing and substituting, she compares
A1S1 + A

 1
1

 
1
 1      1

with its equivalent for S2: Normalize A1 to 1 and let  = 2;
S1 = 2 and S2 = 0: She will be indi¤erent between investing in the two skills if A2 = 3: But
if she invests in skill 1; she will set I1 to :5 at a cost of .25. If she invests in skill 2, she will
choose I2 = 1:5 at a cost of 2.25, making a net wage of 2.25 in both cases. However, if she
is constrained to spend less than 2.25, she will strictly prefer to invest in skill 1: Provided
that the constraint exceeds .25, the constraint is not binding even though it eliminates her
indi¤erence. By continuity, there are values of  > 1, A2 > 3 and the constraint such that if
unconstrained, she would strictly prefer to invest in skill 2 but if constrained invests in skill
1 while spending less than the constraint.
That is, although production at individual jobs is linear, job choice produces a convex
skill value function, and thereby we can have a non-binding but choice-altering resource
constraint. In the general model, we provide su¢ cient conditions for this to occur.
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2.4 Mobility Costs and Firm Investment in General Human Capital
Since Becker (1971) economists have understood that workers should pay for their general
training. Yet rms appear to pay for their workers to acquire general skills. Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999) argue convincingly that a xed mobility cost is insu¢ cient to overturn this
result. They argue that the rm must be able to capture some of the workers increased pro-
ductivity. In Lazear (2009), rms pay for general skills because they have some monopsony
power.
In the example here, we show that in our model a xed mobility cost combined with some
rm bargaining power is su¢ cient for the rm to invest in one of the two skills provided that
the mobility cost is su¢ cient to prevent mobility in equilibrium. Furthermore, the worker
overinvests in one skill in order to improve her bargaining position while the rm overinvests
in the other in order to deter the worker from overinvesting quite so much.
To x ideas, consider the case where S = [1; 0]T , A = [1; 2]T ,  =  = 2,  = I22 and
 = 1. That is, the worker is initially endowed with only a unit of skill 1, but skill 2 is
potentially a more valuable investment since A2 is twice A1.
If there were no mobility cost, the worker would choose J0 = [1; 0]T ; I = [13 ;
p
5
3
]T
and J1 = [23 ;
p
5
3
]T , for a total payo¤ of 7
3
. In other words, the worker starts in a job that uses
only skill 1, invests primarily in skill 2, and then chooses a period 1 job that puts slightly
more weight on skill 2 than skill 1.
With a mobility cost of m levied if the worker chooses to change jobs between periods,
the worker will either act as in the no-cost case and pay m, or take a single job solving
max
J;I
A1J1(S1 + (S1 + I1)) + A2J2(S2 + (S2 + I2))  I21   I22 (11)
which, given the parameter assumptions above, reduces to
max
J;I
J1(2 + I1) + 2J2I2   I21   I22 (12)
subject to J21 + J
2
2 = 1: This gives the corner solution I = [:5; 0]; J = [1; 0], for a payo¤ of
2:25. Comparing the maxima under each scheme, we deduce the worker moves if m  1=12.
If the incumbent rm can extract some of the avoided mobility cost when the
worker does not move, things are quite di¤erent. Consider rms which, following production
and investment by the worker in the rst period, can make a take it or leave it o¤er for
period 1 employment. Outside rms behave competitively and each o¤er the worker her
productivity, but the incumbent rm e¤ectively has monopsony power. If such a deal leaves
the rm with positive surplus, the worker will stay at the incumbent rm and receive a wage
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equal to her outside option, which is simply the highest production her skills can achieve
elsewhere, minus m. But this perversely incentivizes the worker so that even when she
remains at the incumbent rm, she invests as though she was at a rm with di¤erent skill
weights. That is, the worker will invest I = [1
3
;
p
5
3
]T ; as in the case without mobility costs,
despite the fact that she will not actually move to the job [2
3
;
p
5
3
]T . Since the market in
period 0 is competitive, rms make o¤ers that foresee their monopsony power. Consequently,
the worker will get a total payo¤ equal to her lifetime production net of investment costs,
but subject to the incentive distortion.
In other words, the workers job choice will solve
max
J
J1

2 +
1
3

+ J2
 p
5
3
!
which yields J = [ 7p
69
; 2
p
5p
69
]. That is, the workers second-period distortionary incentive to
invest as though she were moving to the job [2
3
;
p
5
3
]T will also distort her original job choice.
In the end, the worker attains a reduced payo¤ of 2:102.
If the rm can commit to invest in the workers skills, this ine¢ ciency can be
partially blunted. Suppose that rms can make period-0 o¤ers that include some provision
of skill investment eI. The rm incurs a cost for this investment C(eI), and the worker can
invest further so that her total investment is I, by expending C(I)   C(eI). As the worker
has an ine¢ ciently high desired level of investment in skill 2, the rm will want to a¤ect that
level by committing to a level of investment in skill 1 beyond what the worker would choose
on her own, 1
3
. By using the investment FOCs, we can show that the worker will respond to
a rm investment eI1 > 13 ; eI2 = 0 by choosing
I2(eI1) = p(1  I1)(3 + I1)
2
:
The o¤er from each rm in period 0 will therefore maximize total worker production subject
to this constraint, so that the worker chooses the o¤er maximizing her ex-ante payo¤. The
job choice ends up being J  [:9; :435]T and the total investment I = [:567; :621]T for a
total payo¤ of 2:144. Thus, rmsability to commit to investing in the worker reduces the
ine¢ ciency.
Notice that the investment in skill 1 o¤ered by the rm, :567, is greater than the worker
would ever choose in the absence of the incentive problem. This is because investment in
skill 1 reduces the workers incentive to invest in skill 2. Suppose instead that the rm
merely committed to investment in skill 1 at the optimal level for production at the current
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job. Then, further skill investment in skill 1 would result in only a second-order loss of net
production at the incumbent rm, but the gain in net production by reducing incentives
to invest in skill 2 is rst-order as the workers investment level in skill 2 is above that
which would satisfy the FOC of net production at the current rm. In other words, the
rm commits to an ine¢ ciently high level of investment in skill 1 in order to dampen the
workers ine¢ ciently high level of investment in skill 2, as the two are seen by the worker as
substitutes. The end result is overinvestment in both skills given the workers job, but for
di¤erent reasons.
3 The Two-Period Model
In this section we generalize the basic two-period model with no uncertainty. We reproduce
the principal results from the example. In section 4, we derive su¢ cient conditions for the
credit constraint and overinvestment results. That section introduces the functional form
we rely on for the continuous time section. Readers who are not interested in the technical
details of the general two-period model can skip to section 4.
There exist N di¤erent skills. A worker is endowed with a skill vector S  01 so that
her level of ability in skill n is Sn. We will discuss investment shortly, but rst consider a
worker with a xed vector of skills.
The worker will choose a job from J  RN+ , the job set. The job set represents the
collection of production technologies at di¤erent jobs, in the form of the set of available skill
weight vectors from which the worker can choose. This set is nonempty, strictly convex,
compact and can be described in terms of a strictly convex, smooth function F : RN ! R
and the positive orthant so that J  fJ 2 RN+ jF (J)  0g.
A worker with skill vector S at job J receives a wage
W (J; S) = (AJ)T S (13)
where A is a diagonal matrix. It may be useful to think of A as allowing us to capture shifts
over time or across individuals in the value of a skill in all jobs. We can scale A and J so
that Ai can be interpreted as the maximum weight that any job puts on skill i.
We further assume that r2F (J) is positive denite when rF (J) >> 0. Finally, if some
Ji = 0 and F (J) = 0 then @F (J)=@Ji  0. In other words, if there is a job that does not use
1Throughout this paper we use vector inequality notation as follows: x >> y , 8i xi > yi; x > y ,
8i xi  yi and x 6= y; x  y , 8i xi  yi. Vectors are columns unless otherwise noted and AT denotes the
transpose of A. r denotes the gradient operator and r2 the Hessian operator. The identity matrix is I.
Finally, for a diagonal matrix A, Ai denotes the ith term on the main diagonal.
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a skill, then there are jobs that put some weight on that skill, without reducing the weight
on the other skills much. This will ensure the worker will choose a job that uses, at least
a little, every skill she possesses. The job set therefore tells us how di¤erent skills can be
combined to produce.
3.1 Single job selection
A worker who must choose a job from J to maximize her wage will solve the constrained
program
max
J2J
W (J; S) = max
J2J
(AJ)T S: (P0)
We can form the associated Lagrangian
L0 = (AJ)T S   F (J): (14)
When S 6= 0, this has a unique (from strict convexity) solution satisfying
AS   rF (J) = 0 (15)
F (J) = 0: (16)
That such a point is a maximizer also follows from the strict convexity of F . Furthermore,
since each job has linear skills weights, J() is homogeneous of degree 0; doubling all of a
workers skills does not change her choice of job.
3.1.1 Relation to skill endowment
As noted, when S >> 0, the rst order condition and our assumptions guarantee that
J >> 0: the worker puts at least some weight on all skills she possesses. We show now, as
is quite intuitive, that this is a general result; the worker puts more weight on a skill when
she has a higher endowment of that skill.
Proposition 1 The weight that the optimal job places on a skill is increasing in that skill:
@Ji
@Si
> 0: (17)
Proof. see appendix for all remaining proofs.
Therefore, as a workers particular skill grows, she will choose a job that puts more weight
on it.
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The value the worker attains with skills S is V (S) = (AJ(S))TS. The Envelope Theorem
tells us thatrV (S) = AJ(S). From this and (17) we can see that the value is strictly convex
in any particular skill. As her ith skill improves, the worker not only gains by becoming
linearly better at her old job, but also gains by selecting jobs that increasingly involve this
improved skill.
3.2 Investment
We now assume the worker lives two periods, chooses a job from J for each (denoted J0 and
J1) and also has a chance to invest in the rst period, with the investment increasing her
skills in the second period. She will discount payo¤s in the second period to the rst by a
factor of .
Her skills will evolve between the two periods by way of an N  N diagonal, positive
denite non-depreciation matrix   INN and an investment vector I.2 Starting with
skills S, the worker will have a skill vector S 0 = S + I in the second period. That is, i is
the part of the endowment in skill i that does not depreciate by period 1 due to aging. The
rate of depreciation may di¤er among skills.
On the other hand, the worker chooses the investment I and pays C(I) at the time of
the investment. We impose restrictions to ensure that workers always want to invest at least
a little in any skill used on the job they plan to choose, that investment is nite and that we
can use standard calculus. Formally, we assume that C : RN+ ! R+ is twice-di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing in each dimension of I, C(0) = 0;rC(0) = 0, and r2C(I) is diagonal and
positive denite on RN++. We also assume that @C(I)=@Ii is unbounded above.
The worker solves the problem
max
I2RN+ ; J0;J12J
JT0 AS + J
T
1 A(S + I)  C(I) (P01)
For this problem, we form the Lagrangian
L01 = JT0 AS + JT1 A(S + I)  C(I)  F (J1)  F (J0): (L01)
Note that Jt corresponds to the vector (Jt1; Jt2)T in the example in Section 2.
Clearly, the part related to J0 is entirely separable from the rest and follows the discussion
2Diagonality implies that depreciation of a skill depends only on the amount of that skill the worker
possesses and not on the level of other skills.
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of job choice with exogenous skills above. The rest of the problem becomes
max
I2RN+ ; J12J
JT1 A(S + I)  C(I) (P1)
L1 = JT1 A(S + I)  C(I)  F (J1): (L1)
The Lagrangian (L1) is solved with the rst order conditions3
A(S + I)  rF (J1 ) = 0 (18)
J1A rC(I) = 0 (19)
F (J1 ) = 0 (20)
and the negative semi-denite (non-bordered) Hessian, in blocks,
H(S; I; J1 ) =
"
 r2F (J1 ) A
A  r2C(I)
#
(21)
3.2.1 Investment and Skill Persistence
One of the striking implications of the model is that prior investment in skills tends to make
skills persistent. We show rst that the worker will never completely abandon investment in
a skill that she has already. Then we show that investment in a skill is weakly increasing in
the level of that skill. In e¤ect, we have a dynamic that looks very much like learning-by-
doing. A worker who has a high level of some skill knows that, despite some depreciation,
she will have a lot of it next period as well. And since she will have a lot next period, she
will choose a job that will put a lot of weight on that skill as well. But this makes it valuable
to invest even more in the skill.
Proposition 2 A worker always continues to invest in any skill she already possesses:
Si > 0) Ii > 0: (22)
As all skills the worker has any initial ability with will be given weight in period 1, the
worker is incentivized to invest a positive amount in them as the marginal cost of doing so
is 0 at an investment of 0. This does not imply that all skills improve; depreciation can
dominate investment.
3Equation (19) has a solution as the additive separability of C(I) across its components as well as the
unboundedness above of each @@IiC(I) give us that rC is a bijection.
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We are not guaranteed a unique solution to the maximization problem, although we will
have it in most generic cases. We assume a unique solution for the remainder of the two-
period model and also that S >> 0 so that we have an interior solution, i.e. J1 >> 0; I
 >>
0. Then we have
Proposition 3 Investment is weakly increasing in the existing endowment of a skill:
@Ii
@Si
 0: (23)
That is to say, workers invest in skills at which they are already good. This is produced by
the fact that costs to improve a skill do not depend on that skills previous level. This is an
expression of specialization persistence. Highly skilled, specialized workers will take a second-
period job that is largely determined by their endowment, and are therefore incentivized to
invest in a way that reects their initial specialization.
Using (17) and the fact the J0-part of (P01) is identical to (P0), we also have
@J0i
@Si
 0 (24)
In other words, both skill investment and the rst jobs skill use are correlated with the
initial endowment. This occurs despite the fact that investment costs do not depend on the
rst job. Therefore, what appears as learning-by-doing may instead simply be the product
of aligned incentives.4
3.3 Comparative Statics
3.3.1 Depreciation
Skill depreciation and initial skills S enter the problem multiplicatively and identically out-
side of rst-period job choice which is in turn entirely separable from the rest of the problem.
As a consequence, the e¤ects ofi on investment and second period job choice are symmetric
to those of Si; we have @Ii =@i = (@I

i =@Si)Si=i  0 and @J1i=@i = (@J1i=@Si)Si=i >
0.
This is signicant. Despite the fact that the new investment will not depreciate by the
time it is used in production, the fact that initial ability in that skill will have, means it is
less worthwhile to invest in it - no one wants to run to stay in place. This can simply be
4A learning-by-doing approach where it is cheaper to invest in skills used at the rst job can explain
internships, apprenticeships and other cases where short-term productivity (not just income) is foregone in
order to facilitate learning. However, these make up a small part of total employment, so we will instead
proceed with the more parsimonious model.
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understood by the fact that @2V (S)=(@Si)2 = @Ji (S)=@Si > 0; the second-period value of
skills is convex in each argument, so increasing depreciation reduces a skills marginal value.
3.3.2 Age
Although the model does not explicitly account for age, we can alter  to change the length
of the second period. This proportionately raises the value of both S and I. The total
expenditure on investment will increase with the remaining time.
Proposition 4 Let  > 0, I be a solution to the problem with discount factor  and I0
be a solution to the problem with discount factor 0. Then C(I) > C(I0).
Therefore, younger workers spend more on investment, as is intuitive. However, this
result only addresses total investment costs. It does not necessarily mean that investment
in any particular individual skill will increase in age. This is illustrated by the following
example.
Convex example. TakeN = 2,  = I with C(I) = 2
3
I
3=2
1 +
3
4
I
4=3
2 and F (J) = J
2
1 +J
2
2 1.
Suppose a worker has S = (0; 0)T . Then V (S + I) = V (I) =
p
I21 + I
2
2 . Fixing C(I),
solving for I2 and taking a second derivative of the objective w.r.t. I1, the result is positive
for all I1 > 0. Therefore, for any xed amount of spending, corner solutions are optimal;
thus, we need only examine corner solutions. For  = :5
p
3, the solution is I = (:75; 0) while
for  =
p
2, the solution is I = (0; 2
p
2); total investment costs are :25
p
3 and 3 respectively.
Therefore, in this example, the younger worker will spend more on skill investment overall,
but less on skill 1 in particular. The intuition here is as follows: investment costs are initially
lower for skill 1, but rise more sharply. A worker with insu¢ cient time to exploit her skills
after investment will therefore want to make a small total investment, and skill 1 is better
suited for that; by contrast, a worker with a higher  will wish to invest more in total, and
skill 2 is better suited for large investments.
4 The Diagonal Form Case
We now work with a specic functional form both to address questions of specialization and
generalization, and to have a exible but workable framework for continuous time. To do
this, we will assume F   1 and C are diagonal forms. We will also derive conditions under
which there is overinvestment in all skills in this case and conditions under which ex ante a
credit constraint is binding even though it appears not to be ex post.
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4.1 Setup
We will be working with job sets which share the form
F (J) =
X
i
Ji   1 (25)
with  > 1. The job-choice problem with skills S is therefore maxJ2RN+ J
TS subject to (25).
Recall that we can always renormalize the job and that therefore the assumption that the
coe¢ cient on Ji is 1 is without loss of generality.
A diagonal form for F + 1 implies a  spherical shape; this means that skills are inter-
related in the same ways, so that we can ignore questions of complementarity versus substi-
tutability and focus on questions of specialization versus generalization. The cost function
we will be using is simply a diagonal form with exponent  > 1 and unit coe¢ cients.5
C(I) =
X
i
Ii : (26)
4.2 Solution
Solving for the rst period job choice, we obtain
V (S) =
 X
i
(AiSi)

 1
! 1

(27)
Ji (S) =
A
1
 1
i S
1
 1
iP
j(AjSj)

 1
 1

= A
1
 1
i S
1
 1
i V (S)
  1
 1 (28)
The investment problem is
max
J2RN+ ;I2RN+
JTA(S + I)  
X
i
Ii (29)
s.t.
X
i
Ji   1  0: (30)
5Unit coe¢ cients are used without loss of generality; using diagonal K as cost coe¢ cients, endowment
S with productivity A would generate the same job choices, production and investment costs as unit cost
coe¢ cients, endowment K
1
S and productivity K 
1
A. As we are not in the business of dening an absolute
notion of a unit of skill, we allow ourselves this normalization.
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Swapping S for S + I we can use (27) to write (29) as
max
I2RN+
24 X
i
(Ai(iSi + Ii))

 1
! 1

 
X
i
Ii
35 : (31)
From there, we can compute the rst order condition with respect to Ii as

A

 1
i (iSi + Ii)
1
 1P
j(Aj(jSj + Ij))

 1
 1

= I 1i (32)
and arrive at 
Ai
Aj

iSi + Ii
jSj + Ij
=

Ii
Ij
( 1)( 1)
: (33)
Corner solutions with Ii = 0 require Si = 0 as usual, but here it is also necessary that
(  1)(   1)  1 for them to exist.6
4.3 Specialization and Generalization
So far we have analyzed period 1 job selection but, as that problem is separable from period
0 job selection, we have not examined the relation between the two. In this subsection, we
examine the conditions under which workers generalize or specialize in their skill set. We
restrict ourselves to the case where  = I for some  < 1 so skills depreciate at the same
relative rate 1  .
In this case, a single measure of the problems convexity can deliver many results simul-
taneously.
@ln
0BB@
@C(I)
@Ii
@C(I)
@Ij
1CCA
@

Ii
Ij
 =
@ln
0BB@
@V (S)
@Si
@V (S)
@Sj
1CCA
@

Si
Sj
 = (  1)(   1) (34)
The ratio of the elasticity of the relative marginal costs to the elasticity of the of the relative
marginal products, ( 1)( 1), tells us how fast costs grow as we move away from balanced
investment, relative to how production grows. If (  1)(   1) > 1, costs grow too fast for
specialization to occur, and the worker generalizes. If, on the other hand, ( 1)( 1) < 1,
6To see this, notice that when Si = 0, the left hand side of (32) goes to 0 slower than the right hand side
as Ii # 0 when (  1)(   1) > 1.
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the costs grow too slow relative to the gains from job selection, so the worker will specialize.
We show the problem in the generalization case is unique.
Proposition 5 When (  1)(  1)  1 and S 6= 0 the global maximizer of (31) is unique.
Now, we can examine the evolution of job choice in the generalization world. When
(   1)(   1) > 1, the optimal second-period job when S = 0 denes an attractor for job
weight ratios. When the ratio of the weights assigned to two skills in the rst period is
not the same as in the S=0 problem, the following period the ratios of skill weights will be
closer to those when S = 0. We regard this as generalization - regardless of their initial skill
endowments, all workers in such a model move towards a common, non-extreme skill set.
Proposition 6 If (   1)(   1) > 1, 9 :  = I then for each i; j, if J0i(S)=J0j(S) >
J1i(0)=J

1j(0) then J

0i(S)=J

0j(S) > J

1i(S)=J

1j(S).
4.4 Credit Constraints and Relation to the Ben-Porath Model
Other than addressing the multiplicity of skills, our model so far di¤ers from the standard
Ben-Porath model in two ways. First, it is set in discrete time. This is unimportant. Later
in the paper, we explore the diagonal version of the model in continuous time. The second
is that the standard presentation of the Ben-Porath model assumes that investment takes
the form of foregone production. Workers devote a fraction of their time to investing. In
contrast, we treat investment as a cost. Workers can purchase skills.
For the most part this distinction is unimportant and largely a matter of convenience.
We can think of someone who is capable of earning $x and chooses to invest $y as foregoing
a proportion y=x of her income. Where it becomes important is when the optimal y > x: In
some ways this can be resolved by simply imposing the additional constraint that C (I) 
JT0 S which would only slightly complicate the model.
However, we show in this section that a constraint can work di¤erently than it does in
the Ben-Porath model. In that model, when the constraint binds, the individual spends all
of her resources on investment, which is typically interpreted as being engaged in full-time
schooling. We show here that when there are multiple skills, this conclusion is no longer
valid. The skill value function V is weakly convex, with the convexity inequality strict for
all but parallel skill vectors. As a consequence, on RN++, V () is strictly convex in each
component of S, despite the fact that any individual jobs production function is linear.
This can make the investment problem non-convex, and therefore produce solutions a¤ected
by the constraint, but without the constraint binding with equality. We derive su¢ cient
conditions for this to be true.
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In a world of specialization, when skill productivity varies su¢ ciently, there are always
endowments and budget constraints such that the budget constraint does not bind with
equality but a¤ects the optimum. Let Ic () denote the function mapping the endowment S
into optimal investment when the constraint is c.
Proposition 7 If (   1)(   1) < 1 and A1 < maxiAi =: A2 such that

A2
A1
 
 1
(1  

( 1)

A2
A1
 ( 1)( 1) 1
 1
) > 1,7 then 9S; c : C(Ic (S)) < c and C(I(S)) > c.
The basic intuition can be seen in Figure 1 which shows, in an example, how the budget
constraint a¤ects both total investment and the particular skills invested in. As the worker
is endowed with much skill 1, for low values of the constraint he simply continues investing
in that skill. Its not worth investing in skill 1 for long, as its productivity is mediocre, so
investment is constant when c 2 [:25; 1]. However, once the constraint is greater than 1 the
worker specializes heavily in skill 2, and the constraint once again binds until c = 4. Beyond
that, further investment is ine¢ cient, and relaxing the constraint further has no e¤ect on
net output.
Figure 1: Investment expenditure in skill 1 (solid line) and 2 (dotted line) as a function of
the budget constraint c when A1 = 1; A2 = 4; S1 = 2:75; S2 = 0;  = 2;   1.
7Notice that since (   1)(  1) < 1, for large enough A2=A1 this holds.
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4.5 Mobility Costs and Overinvestment
Consider again the problem that arises when rms can o¤er wages to the worker and mobility
costs give the incumbent rm local monopsony power. Once again, suppose that to coun-
teract the workers ine¢ cient investment incentives, the rm may commit to provide some
skill investment as part of the period 0 job o¤er. We now derive a su¢ cient condition for
overinvestment in all skills if mobility costs are su¢ cient to prevent mobility in equilibrium.
It turns out that this is always true provided that the worker would move in the absence
of the mobility cost and that the condition for workers to generalize over their lifetime is
satised.8
Let the mobility cost be m. Denote the workers investment best response function
mapping the rms investment commitment to total investment by IW (). Note that IW
refers to the combined investment regardless of whether carried out by the rm or worker.
Proposition 8 Let C and F + 1 be diagonal forms with (   1)(   1) > 1. Suppose the
worker with skill endowment S >> 0 does not move in period 1, but would absent the mobility
cost. Then the optimal contract (J; IF ; w0) satises IW (IF ) >> I(J).
The intuition for this result is simple: to the worker, investments in di¤erent skills are
substitutes. The workers incentives are to overinvest in certain skills relative to the current
jobs weights in order to improve the outside option for bargaining purposes. Then, by
increasing investment in other skills - those not overinvested in - the rm can dampen the
workers incentives. The rm wants to commit to overinvest in these counterweight-skills, as
at the appropriate level of investment for the current job, the direct e¤ect on net production
has a zero FOC (by denition), but the e¢ ciency gain from reducing excessive investment
elsewhere is a rst-order e¤ect.
5 Continuous Time
We now wish to move the model to continuous time. We will keep the Diagonal Form
structure in doing so, and retain much of the relevant intuition.
5.1 Setup
The problem is now dened over an interval in continuous time [0; T ], which is discounted
at a rate r. The worker possesses skills S(t) at time t; the productivity matrix is A and
8It additionally holds in the two-skill case in a more general setting, provided that the workers investment
is a continuous function of the rms commitment.
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the worker chooses jobs J(t) from the job set J = fJ 2 RN+ j
P
i J

i  1g so that her time-
t instantaneous production is J(t)TAS(t). Skills depreciate at relative rates given by the
diagonal matrix D := I , counterbalanced by investment I(t), so that
d
dt
S(t) =  DS(t) + I(t): (35)
However, investment is costly, with time-t instantaneous cost C(I(t)) =
P
i Ii(t)
 - the
diagonal form. Endowed with initial skills S0, the worker therefore seeks to maximize her
lifetime utility by solving
max
J :[0;T ]!J ; I:[0;T ]!RN++
Z 1
0
e rt
"
J(t)TAS(t) 
X
i
Ii(t)

#
dt (36)
s:t:
d
dt
S(t) =  DS(t) + I(t) (37)
S(0) = S0 (38)
The worker chooses I(t) and J(t) optimally. However, as J does not inuence the state
variable, it is chosen according to (27). Thus, we can bypass job selection for the moment
and reduce the problem to
max
I:[0;T ]!RN++
Z 1
0
e rt
24 X
i
(AiSi(t))

 1
! 1

 
X
i
Ii(t)

35 dt (39)
s:t:
d
dt
S(t) =  DS(t) + I(t) (40)
S(0) = S0: (41)
We therefore construct the Hamiltonian
H = e rt
24 X
i
(AiSi(t))

 1
! 1

 
X
i
Ii(t)

35+X
i
i( DiSi(t) + Ii(t)): (42)
The solution is given by the i equations
A

 1
i (Si(t))
1
 1P
i(AiSi(t))

 1
 1

+ (  1)Ii(t) 2dIi(t)
dt
  (r +Di)Ii(t) 1 = 0 (43)
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along with the motion equations for skills
d
dt
S(t) =  DS(t) + I(t); (44)
the initial condition S(0) = S0, and the transversality condition I(T ) = 0.
5.2 Ben-Porath Case
In the special case where all skills grow at the same rate, the rst term in (43) can be replaced
with Ki, a skill-specic term that is constant over time. In this case the solution to (43)
becomes
Ii (t) =

Ki
1  e(r+Di)(t T )
 (r +Di)
 1
 1
: (45)
Note that, as required for constant Ki; the ratio of investment in any two skills is constant.
Figure 2 graphs an example of this Ben-Porath case. The worker enters the market
with twice as many units of skill 1 as of skill 2. Although the values of  and  are chosen
so that there is a tendency to generalize skills, this is exactly o¤set by the greater initial
endowment of skill 1 and the higher productivity of skill 1 for the worker so that the workers
investment maintains the 2 : 1 ratio of skill 1 to skill 2. Net output (the wage) shows the
classic hump-shaped pattern of the Ben-Porath model and peaks later than gross output.
Since investment reaches 0 at exactly time T , this is the point at which the two are equal.
Unlike in the Ben-Porath model, we allow for investment in excess of production. In this
and the other examples given, production net of investment starts out negative, meaning the
worker is borrowing to nance the early stages of her skill investment.
5.3 Jobs and Skills Over the Lifecycle
It is generally not possible to obtain a closed form solution for (43). We can, however, solve
the system numerically for given values of A; D; r and S0. To demonstrate the potential
usefulness of this approach, we present a scenario that we nd particularly interesting.
The scenario has three skills which we refer to as skills 1, 2 and 3, but the reader may
think of them as nonroutine manual, routine cognitive and nonroutine cognitive. Our chief
example considers a worker subject to an unanticipated shock that increases the value of
nonroutine cognitive skills while also decreasing the value of routine cognitive tasks. In reality,
combinations of skills may have di¤ering degrees of synergy. Nevertheless, we think even
the simple example using diagonal form, which treats skills complementarity symmetrically,
provides some useful insights.
21
Figure 2: The case of proportional skill evolution.
We consider an individual who arrives in the labor market with 10 units of each skill.
Initially the second skill is the most valuable (A2 = 1:2); the rst lies in the middle (A1 =
1:13) and the third skill is the least valuable (A3 = :8) to the worker. The worker is assumed
to be in the labor force for forty years. We consider an unanticipated shock that occurs
in either the workers 10th, 20th or 30th year (and for some purposes the 35th year) in
the market. The shock reduces A2 to :8 and increases A3 to 1:25 while leaving A1 at 1:13:
If workers typically arrive in the market with similar amounts of skills 2 and 3, the shock
represents a mild form of positive shock for the youngest workers.
Figure 3 shows the path of the three skill weights for the individual if she experiences no
shock and at 10, 20 or 30 years of experience. The top left corner shows the baseline with
no shock. Absent the shock, the worker specializes in skill 2.
Continuing clockwise, we see that if the shock arrives when she has thirty years experi-
ence, she immediately mechanically (since A2 falls) nds herself a job that puts less weight
on skill 2. Comparing the two panels, it is also evident that she increases her net investment
in skills 1 and 3 relative to her net investment in skill 2 once the shock hits since the weights
22
Figure 3: Job Weights by Experience by Timing of Shock
on the former now grow rather than shrink. In fact, most of the adjustment can be shown to
come from reduced investment in skill 2 rather than increased investment in the other skills.
This can be seen most clearly in Figure 4 which shows the stocks of skills at each point in
time. In the end, she adjusts very little. She continues to work in jobs that focus on the skill
in which she has accumulated a large stock even though the value of that stock has fallen
by about one third.
A shock at twenty years of experience has a more noticeable e¤ect on shifting the job
weights. But because her stock of skill 3 has depreciated so much over twenty years, by the
end of her career, she shifts towards a job that places the most weight on skill 1. Much, but
not all, of the increased weight on skill 3 reects the greatly increased value of that skill in
all jobs rather than a very large shift towards investment in skill 3.
Only when the shock arrives su¢ ciently early in her career does she adjust by investing
much more heavily in skill 3 and somewhat more in skill 1 so that ten years after the shock,
she works in a job that places the greatest weight on skill 3.
Figure 5 shows net output over time. As the worker has invested most heavily in a skill
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Figure 4: Skill Levels by Experience by Timing of Shock
whose value is reduced, the worker su¤ers an immediate adverse shock to net output. The
magnitude of the shock will depend largely on how much of skill 2 she has accumulated
relative to skill 3. As a consequence, the individual shocked at 10 years of experience su¤ers
an earlier but smaller output shock. Compared to a similar person su¤ering a shock at 20
years of experience, she has higher output at nearly every later experience level. When the
shock hits the similar person at 30 years, the one shocked at 10 years has already recovered
su¢ ciently to have higher net output. The person shocked at 20 years of experience fares
almost as badly in the last 30 years of work as the person shocked at 30 years.
More generally, in this example in which the shock is in a sense positive, a worker who
begins her career just as the shock hits will benet. One who ends her career just as the
shock hits will be una¤ected. By continuity there will be a range of low experience levels
at which the e¤ect of the shock will be positive. We expect, but have not shown, that the
e¤ect of the shock is U-shaped.
We can broaden this discussion to ask who is most adversely a¤ected by the shock. The
easiest way to answer this question is by comparing the present value of net output. In
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Figure 5: Net Output and Experience by Timing of Shock
our example, this value is highest for the person who is never shocked and decreases as the
timing of the shock moves to 35 to 30 to 20 to 10 years of experience. Since we know that
a shock at 0 years of experience would have a positive e¤ect, the signicant point is that a
positive shock can have a negative e¤ect for a very long time. In 5, the individual shocked
at 10 years of experience never returns to the net output level that she would have reached
in the absence of a shock.
At the same time, the PDV of net output may be a misleading measure of how adversely
the worker is a¤ected. It requires that utility be linear in income. If workers are risk averse
and smooth consumption over their lifetimes, then a worker subjected to an unanticipated
negative shock will have lower lifetime utility than one with the same PDV of net output
but who does not experience an unanticipated shock, since the latter, but not the former,
can fully smooth consumption.
If the workers in our sample smooth consumption over their lifetimes, very young workers
will have accumulated less debt than somewhat older workers while workers nearing retire-
ment will have accumulated more retirement savings than those somewhat further from
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retirement. Therefore, very young workers and those nearing retirement do not need to re-
duce the ow of consumption by as much as someone in between. We continue our example
by assuming that people live for another 20 years following retirement and smooth their
consumption perfectly except for the e¤ect of the unanticipated shock. Here we nd that a
worker shocked at 20 years of experience must reduce her consumption by almost half (47
percent) relative to what she had anticipated. In contrast, workers shocked at 10 and 30
years of experience must reduce their consumption by 35 percent and 36 percent.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the example is the length of time for which an
ultimately positive shock can be negative. The same worker who spends her entire career
after the shock will earn 6.3 percent more over her lifetime than if she nished her career
before the shock hit. Yet even a worker who was only ve years into her career never
recovers from the shock and su¤ers a decline of about one-third in future consumption. This
is because skill investment is extremely front-loaded to allow for longer exploitation time, so
the loss is great even when the shock hits early. While ours is an example, not a calibration
exercise, we nd this duration and magnitude of the e¤ect striking.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We believe that our model provides both qualitative and quantitative insights. It provides as
explanation for rm investments in general skills that draws on the insight of Lazear (2009)
and is complementary to the story told there. It also suggests that nonconvexities arise
naturally in a model of multiple skills and that these nonconvexities can create settings in
which credit constraints a¤ect behavior even though they are not binding in equilibrium.
When extended to a continuous time setting, our model is tractable and suggests that
large shocks, even if positive on net, can have long-lasting adverse e¤ects on even relatively
young workers. While a full treatment of the e¤ect of trade deals which raise the price of
some skills and lower others would require us to model complementarities among skills more
fully and to consider building mobility costs into the simulation, our example should make
us think very carefully about the winners and losers and perhaps even the political economy
issues.
Since Ricardo, arguments for trade and technological innovation have relied on compen-
sating transfers. But our model suggests two additional considerations. First, losers may be
di¢ cult to detect. Losers include a) workers who continue using similar skills but the value
of those skills has declined, b) workers who are able to shift to jobs whose value has not
been greatly altered but whose value is less than that of the job the worker would otherwise
have held, and c) even some workers who eventually shift to jobs that place a relatively
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high weight on the skills that have increased in value. Moreover, our analysis suggests that
the importance of credit constraints for limiting transitions to better jobs may be hidden
because workers may be unable to a¤ord to acquire the optimal set of new skills even though
they do not appear to be credit constrained. While it may be optimal for some workers to
continue to work in jobs that have declined in value, other workers may cling to such jobs
because they cannot a¤ord retraining. For workers to adjust more adequately to skill-biased
technical and trade shocks, transfer and retraining policies may have to start as soon as
foresight permits.
7 References
Acemoglu, Daron and Steve Pischke. Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Mar-
kets,Economic Journal, 109 (February 1999): F112-142.
Altonji, Joseph G., Multiple Skills, Multiple Types of Education, and the Labor Market:
A Research Agenda (September 2010). American Economic Association, Ten Years and
Beyond: Economists Answer NSFs Call for Long-Term Research Agendas. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1888514 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1888514
Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane, The Skill Content of Recent
Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4)
(November 2003):1279-1333.
Becker, Gary S. Human Capital, 2nd ed., Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975.
Ben-Porath, Yoram, The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings,
Journal of Political Economy, 75(4, Part 1) (August 1967): 352-365.
Bowlus, Audra J., Hiroaki Mori and Chris Robinson, Ageing and the Skill Portfolio:
Evidence from Job Based Skill Measures, Journal of the Economics of Ageing, 7 (April
2016):89-103.
Cunha, Flavio and James J. Heckman, Formulating, Identifying, and Estimating the
Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation, Journal of Human Resources
43 (2008), 738-782.
Fiacco, Anthony V. Sensitivity analysis for nonlinear programming using penalty meth-
ods." Mathematical programming 10.1 (1976): 287-311.
Lazear, Edward, Firm-Specic Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach,Journal of
Political Economy, 117 (October 2009): 914 - 940.
Prada, Maria F., and Sergio S. Urzuaoa. One Size Does Not Fit All: Multiple Dimensions
of Ability, College Attendance and Wages". Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming..
27
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From Fiacco (1976), we have that J is di¤erentiable with respect to S. Taking a derivative
of (15) with respect to Si, we have
[0; :::0; Ai; 0; :::; 0]
T   @
@Si
rF (J)  r2F (J)@J

@Si
= 0: (46)
Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to Si, we obtain @J

@Si
TrF (J) = 0. Premultiplying (46)
with @J

@Si
T
and using that fact, we have
Ai
@Ji
@Si
  @
@Si
@J
@Si
T
rF (J) = @J

@Si
T
r2F (J)@J

@Si
(47)
 1Ai
@Ji
@Si
=
@J
@Si
T
r2F (J)@J

@Si
(48)
As S >> 0, rF (J) > 0 and therefore by assumption r2F (J) is positive denite; thus,
the right hand side term is positive as a quadratic form on a positive denite matrix and we
have @J

i
@Si
> 0 as required.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting for J1 using (19) in (18) and (20) we have
A(S + I)  rF ( 1A 1rC(I)) = 0 (49)
F ( 1A 1rC(I)) = 0 (50)
and also, substituting in the block Hessian:
H(S; I;  1A 1rC(I)) =
"
 r2F ( 1A 1rC(I)) A
A  r2C(I)
#
(51)
From (49), Si > 0 implies that @@JiF (J) > 0. From this and the assumption that Ji = 0 )
@
@Ji
F (J)  0, we have that @
@Ii
C(I) > 0; but as weve assumed that rC(0) = 0 and that C
is additively separable , it must be that Ii > 0 to satisfy
@
@Ii
C(I) > 0.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Di¤erentiating (49) and (50) with respect to Si, recalling that  and A are diagonal and
suppressing functional arguments, we have
[0; ::; 0; Aii; 0; ::; 0]
T + A
@I
@Si
  @
@Si
rF    1r2FA 1r2C@I

@Si
= 0 (52)
(rF )TA 1r2C@I

@Si
= 0: (53)
Premultiplying (52) with (@I

@Si
)Tr2C(I)A 1 and recalling r2C is diagonal, we get
i
@Ii
@Si
@2C
@Ii
2 + 

@I
@Si
T
r2C@I

@Si
=  1

@I
@Si
T
r2CA 1r2FA 1r2C@I

@Si
(54)
ii
@Ii
@Si
@2C
@Ii
2 =   2

@I
@Si
T
r2CA 1
h
  r2F + 2A(r2C) 1A
i
A 1r2C@I

@Si
(55)
As  r2F + (A)(r2C) 1(A) is the Schur complement of the (negative semi-denite)
Hessian with respect to the (negative denite) block  r2C, it is negative semi-denite.
Therefore, as the negative of a quadratic form on a negative semi-denite matrix, the right
hand side of (55) a whole is nonnegative; thus proving the proposition.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose I is a solution to the problem with discount  and I0 is one with 0. Then,
optimality implies
V (S + I)  C(I)  V (S + I0)  C(I0) (56)
0V (S + I0)  C(I0)  0V (S + I)  C(I) (57)
so that, after some manipulation
(C(I0)  C(I))(0   )  0 (58)
C(I)  C(I0) (59)
Now, supposing C(I) = C(I0) for contradiction, we have V (S+I) = V (S+I0) or else
one of the objective functions is improvable. Then, from the rst order condition for I0 we
have 0rV (S + I0) = rC(I0) and thus rV (S + I0) >> rC(I0). This means that
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I0 also achieves the supposed maximum in the  problem, but with positive rst derivatives
in the maximizers and therefore I is not a maximizer. Hence, it must be the case that
C(I) > C(I0).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. From (32) and (27) we have that global maximizers must satisfy
A

 1
ii (iiSi + I

i )
1
 1 (V (S + I)) 
1
 1 = I 1i (60)
, 1 Aii
(iiSi + I

i )
I
( 1)( 1)
i
= V (S + I)) (61)
Suppose the global maximum is ; then for any global maximizer I,
V (S + I
0
)) 
X
j
Ij = ; (62)
and thus from (61)
1 Aii
(iiSi + I

i )
I
( 1)( 1)
i
 
X
j
Ij = : (63)
As (   1)(   1)  1, the leftmost component is strictly decreasing in Ii for each i and
therefore injective. Thus two global maximizers with the same total investment costs
P
j I

j
are identical. Suppose now that two global maximizers I and I
0
exist, and
P
j I

j <
P
j I
0
j ;
then from the strict decreasing nature of the left-most term, for each i we have Ii > I
0
i : But
this contradicts
P
j I

j <
P
j I
0
j . Therefore the global maximizer I
 is unique.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Suppose (   1)(   1) > 1,  = I and J0i(S)=J0j(S) > J1i(0)=J1j(0). First, we
nd J1 (0) from the FOC:
Ii (0) =



 1
 1 A

( 1)( 1) 1
iP
j A

( 1)( 1) 1
j
 1
( 1)
(64)
and then
J1i(0) =
A

( 1)( 1) 1
iP
j A

( 1)( 1) 1
j
 1

: (65)
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From this, J0i(S)=J

0j(S) > J

1i(0)=J

1j(0) and the job FOC we have
A
1
 1
ii S
1
 1
i
A
1
 1
jj S
1
 1
j
>
A

( 1)( 1) 1
ii
A

( 1)( 1) 1
jj
,

Ai
Aj

<

Si
Sj
( 1)( 1) 1
: (66)
Now, as the solution for S >> 0 is interior, recall from (32)
Ai
Aj
 
Si + Ii
Sj + Ij

=

Ii
Ij
( 1)( 1)
:
so that using (66) we obtain
Si
Sj
( 1)( 1) 1
Si + Ii
Sj + Ij
>

Ii
Ij
( 1)( 1)
(67)
 + Ii
Si
 +
Ij
Sj
>
 
Ii
Si
Ij
Sj
!( 1)( 1)
(68)


Ii
Si
 ( 1)( 1)
+

Ii
Si
1 ( 1)( 1)
> 

Ij
Sj
 ( 1)( 1)
+

Ij
Sj
1 ( 1)( 1)
(69)
But given that (  1)(   1) > 1, the expression x ( 1)( 1) + x1 ( 1)( 1) is necessarily
strictly decreasing in x; therefore (69) implies Ii
Si
<
Ij
Sj
. This in turn implies
Si
Sj
>
Si + Ii
Sj + Ij
(70)
and from this and (28) we have
J0i(S)
J0j(S)
=
A
1
 1
ii S
1
 1
i
A
1
 1
jj S
1
 1
j
>
A
1
 1
ii (Si + Ii)
1
 1
A
1
 1
jj (Sj + Ij)
1
 1
=
J1i(S)
J1j(S)
(71)
as required.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Fix k > 1 such that

A2
A1
 
 1
(1 k 
( 1)

A2
A1
 ( 1)( 1) 1
 1
) > 1, possible ex hypothesi.
Set c =

A1

 
 1
k and S =

A2
A1

c
1
 ; 0; 0:::
T
, First, suppose that the constraint c binds.
Consider the problem of allocating c across the di¤erent skills; each i > 1 is allocated Ii and
31
the remainder goes to skill 1.
max bind = max
 
[A1(S1 + (c 
X
j>1
Ij )
1
 )]

 1 +
X
j>1
(AjIj)

 1
! 1

then (ignoring the outer power) the rst order condition with respect to Ii is
@bind
@Ii
=

   1
 
A

 1
i I
1
 1
i   A

 1
1 [S1 + (c 
X
j>1
Ij )
1
 ]
1
 1 (c 
X
j>1
Ij )
1 
 I 1i
!
which is 0 for Ii = 0. For Ii > 0, recalling (  1)(   1) < 1,
@bind
@Ii
=

   1I
1
 1
i
 
A

 1
i   A

 1
1 [S1 + (c 
X
j>1
Ij )
1
 ]
1
 1 (c 
X
j>1
Ij )
1 
 I
( 1)( 1) 1
 1
i
!
<

   1I
1
 1
i

A

 1
i   A

 1
1 S
1
 1
1 c
1 
 c
( 1)( 1) 1
 1

=

   1I
1
 1
i

A

 1
i   A

 1
1 S
1
 1
1 c
 1
( 1)

=

   1I
1
 1
i

A

 1
i   A

 1
2

 0:
Therefore, if the budget constraint is to bind, it must be that it is spent only on skill 1. If
the worker invests only in skill 1, she solves
max
I1



(A1(S1 + I1))

 1
 1
   I1

so that I1 =

A1

 1
 1
for an expenditure of

A1

 
 1
< c. As a consequence of these
two points, the budget constraint c does not bind. To construct a lower bound for the
unconstrained workers payo¤, we suppose the worker only invests in skill 2 and suppose
the job that only puts weight on skill 2 is chosen. This results in a payo¤ of A2I2   I2 =
A2

 
 1
(  1). We want to show this is greater than the constrained payo¤, that is,

A2

 
 1
(  1) > A1S1 +

A1

 
 1
(  1)
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which, after rearrangement and division by ( A1

)

 1 (  1) becomes

A2
A1
 
 1
 
1  k 
(  1)

A2
A1
 ( 1)( 1) 1
 1
!
> 1
which we know to be true; therefore, the unconstrained problem yields strictly higher utility.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Step 1: J is not optimal in period 1 in the absence of a mobility cost.
The contract maximizes
maxfmax
J^
[J^TA(S + S + IW (IF ))];max
J^
[J^TAS] + max
J^
[J^TA(S + IW (IF )] mg: (72)
As the worker does not move, we have
J = arg max
J^
J^TA(S + S + IW (IF )) (73)
From the fact the worker would move absent the mobility cost, we have
max
J^
J^TA(S + S + IW (IF )) < max
J^
[J^TAS] + max
J^
[J^TA(S + IW (IF ))] (74)
Thus S and S + IW (IF ) are not parallel. Then from J solving rF (J) k A(S + S +
IW (IF )) uniquely on F (J) = 0, we have that rF (J) 6k A(S + IW (IF )). And therefore
J 6= arg maxJ^ [J^TA(S + IW (IF )].
Step 2: No skill is underinvested in, and at least one is overinvested in. Given IF ,
the worker chooses IW to maximize
max
IW
V (S + IW )  c(IW ) + c(IF ) s.t. IW  IF (75)
which given the diagonal forms assumption and the exogeneity of IF is the same problem as
max
IW
24 X
i
(Ai(iSi + I
W
i ))

 1
! 1

35 X
i
IWi s.t. IW  IF (76)
The rst order condition for IWi (when the ith constraint does not bind and thus I
W
i >
33
IFi ) is
A

 1
i (iSi + I
W
i )
1
 1
 X
j
(Aj(jSi + I
W
j ))

 1
! 1

  IW  1i = 0 (77)
which can be rewritten as
Ai
iSi + I
W
i
I
W ( 1)( 1)
i
= V (S + IW ) (78)
As (  1)(  1) > 1 by hypothesis, the left hand side is decreasing in IWi . Therefore IWi is
decreasing in V .
If dV (S+I
W )
dIFj
 0 then for any i such that IWi (IF ) > IFi , we would have dI
W
i (I
F )
dIFi
> 0 and
thus as V (S+IW ) = (
P
k(Ak(S+I
W ))

 1 )
 1
 , V would have to increase, a contradiction.
Thus, we have shown that if IWi (I
F ) > IFi and I
W
j (I
F ) = IFj then dI
W
i (I
F )=dIFj < 0 (?) .
Ex ante, the contract maximizes
max
IF
JTA(S + IW (IF ))  C(IW (IF )) (79)
If for all i we have IWi (I
F )  Ii (J) then J(S + I(J))  J and therefore either J is
in the interior of J and therefore a job where the worker is more productive both periods
exists (a contradiction) or J is optimal in the second period in the absence of a moving cost,
not the case by Step 1. Therefore there is an i for which IWi (I
F ) > Ii (J).
Suppose there is an i for which IWi (I
F ) < Ii (J). Then setting 8j; IF 0j := maxfIWj ; Ij (J)g,
from ? we have that IW (IF 0) = IF 0. Therefore, IF 0 improves the objective (79), a contradic-
tion. So IW (IF ) 	 I(J).
Step 3: Every skill is overinvested in.
Now suppose 9i : IWi (IF ) = Ii (J). As IW 	 I(J), there must be a j such that
IWj (I
F ) > Ij (J). Two cases are of interest.
Case 1. Suppose (78) holds for IWj . Then, dene I
F = IW (IF ); we have IW (IF ) = IW (IF )
and, as IF is part of an optimal contract, so is IF (albeit with a compensating period-0 wage).
We will consider increasing I^Fi to e¤ect an increase in V and through it will implement a
decrease in I^Fj without a¤ecting (Ik)k 62fi;jg.
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We dene the auxiliary function I^Fj (I^
F
i ) implicitly by
Aj
jSj + I^
F
j
I^
F ( 1)( 1)
j
= V

(iSi + I^
F
i ); (jSj + I^
F
j ); (kSk +
IFk )k 62fi;jg

(80)
As S >> 0, we have @V=@I^Fi > 0 and @V=@I^
F
j > 0; furthermore, the left hand side is
decreasing in I^Fj as (  1)(   1) > 1. Therefore, we have dI^Fj (I^Fi )=dI^Fi < 0.
Consider now perturbing the optimal contract IF by increasing IFi and lowering I
F
j along
I^Fj (). As V

(iSi + I^
F
i ); (jSj + I^
F
j ); (kSk + I
F
k )k 62fi;jg

 V (IF ) when I^Fi  IFi , we
have that IW (I^Fi ; I^
F
j (I^
F
i ); (
Ik)k 62fi;jg) = (I^Fi ; I^
F
j (I^
F
i ); (
Ik)k 62fi;jg).
Written solely in terms of I^Fi (and keeping constant in skills other than i and j), the
objective function is
JTA((iSi + I^
F
i ); (jSj +
IFj (I^
F
i )); (kSk +
IFk )k 62fi;jg)  C((I^Fi ; I^Fj (I^Fi ); (Ik)k 62fi;jg)) (81)
and is ex hypothesi maximized at I^Fi = I
F
i . Taking a right derivative of the objective
with respect to I^Fi we get
AiJi + AjJj
dI^Fj (I^
F
i )
dI^Fi
)  I^F 1i  
dI^Fj (I^
F
i )
dI^Fi
(I^Fj (I^
F
i ))
 1 (82)
= (AiJi   IF 1i ) +
dI^Fj (I^
F
i )
dI^Fi
(AjJj   I^Fj (IFi ) 1) (83)
But by assumption IFi = I

i (J), so that AiJi   IF 1i = 0 and I^Fj (IFi ) = IFj > Ij (J) so
that AjJj   I^Fj (IFi ) 1 < 0. Furthermore, we have that
dI^Fj (I^
F
i )
dI^Fi
< 0. Therefore evaluated
at IFi , the restricted objective functions right derivative is positive. As a result, there exists
a I^Fi > I
F
i so that (I^
F
i ; I^
F
j (I^
F
i ); (
Ik)k 62fi;jg) improves the objective function over the assumed
maximizer IF , a contradiction.
Case 2. Now suppose instead that (78) does not hold for any IWj . Consider again I
F =
IW (IF ), which is again optimal under the hypothesis that IF is. Dene I^Fj (I^
F
i ) by
V

(iSi + I^
F
i ); (jSj + I^
F
j ); (kSk +
IFk )k 62fi;jg

= V (S + IF ) when I^Fi  IFi is small
enough for a solution to exist. In other words, I^Fj adjusts to I^
F
i so as to keep production at
the outside option job constant.
Then as V is constant along (I^Fi ; I
F
j (I^
F
i )) for I^
F
i > I
F
i , skills k 62 fi; jg stay constant. As
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V has strictly positive (as S >> 0) and continuous partials, dI^Fj (I^
F
i )=dI^
F
i > 0; the rest of
the argument follows as in Case 1.
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